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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we advance the idea that optimal risk management under the Basel II Accord 
will typically require the use of a combination of different models of risk.  This idea is 
illustrated by analyzing the best empirical models of risk for five stock indexes before, during, 
and after the 2008-09 financial crisis. The data used are the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
Financial Times Stock Exchange 100, Nikkei, Hang Seng and Standard and Poor’s 500 
Composite Index. The primary goal of the exercise is to identify the best models for risk 
management in each period according to the minimization of average daily capital 
requirements under the Basel II Accord. It is found that the best risk models can and do vary 
before, during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis. Moreover, it is found that an aggressive 
risk management strategy, namely the supremum strategy that combines different models of 
risk, can result in significant gains in average daily capital requirements, relative to the 
strategy of using single models, while staying within the limits of the Basel II Accord.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Optimal risk management, average daily capital requirements,  alternative risk 
strategies, value-at-risk forecasts, combining risk models. 
  
JEL Classifications: G32, G11, G17, C53, C22 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The Basel II Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)) was designed to 
monitor and encourage sensible risk taking by using appropriate models of risk to calculate 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) and subsequent daily capital charges.  
 
VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential expected financial 
loss over a given period, and is a standard tool in risk management. It has become especially 
important following the 2005 amendment to the Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2005) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009)),1 whereby banks 
and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) were permitted and encouraged to 
use internal models to forecast daily VaR (see Jorion (2000) for a detailed discussion).  
 
Risk management is important both for regulatory authorities and for ADIs. Financial 
regulators want ADIs to have sufficient liquidity and solvency. ADIs want to maximize 
profits from their investments in financial assets and remain in good standing with their 
regulators. 
 
In this paper we define risk management in terms of choosing sensibly from a variety of risk 
models. This approach includes the criteria for selection of optimal risk models, together with 
considering the strategy of combining alternative risk models. The choice of risk models to be 
considered may vary over time, even daily.  
 
The amendment to the initial Basel Accord was designed to encourage and reward institutions 
with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby actual returns are 
compared with the corresponding VaR forecasts, was introduced to assess the quality of the 
internal models used by ADIs. In cases where internal models lead to a greater number of 
violations than could reasonably be expected, given the confidence level, the ADI is required 
to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 6 in Appendix 1) for the penalties imposed under 
the Basel II Accord). Penalties imposed on ADIs affect profitability directly through higher 
                                                 
1 The 2005 document contains the January 1996 text of the “Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate 
market risks” modified to reflect the following textual changes: (i) Modification to the Amendment to the 
Capital Accord to incorporate market risks (September 1997 press release); and (ii) The Application of Basel II 
to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects. 
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capital charges, and indirectly through the imposition of a more stringent external model to 
forecast VaR. 
 
Excessive conservatism can have a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs as higher 
capital charges are subsequently required. Therefore, it is sensible for ADIs to consider a 
strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how many times they should violate in any 
financial year (for further details, see McAleer and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b), McAleer (2005, 
2009), Caporin and McAleer (2009), McAleer et al. (2009a, 2009b), and Jiménez-Martín et al. 
(2009)). 
 
In this paper we emphasize the idea that optimal risk management requires the use of different 
risk models over time. This appreoach is illustrated using Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) 
index, Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE) 
index, Nikkei (NK) index, and Hang Seng (HSI) index, from 3 January 2000 to 14 July 2009. 
The optimal models of risk management are identified according to the minimization of 
average daily capital charges under the Basel II Accord. A risk management strategy is 
proposed, namely choosing the supremum of the forecasted VaR of alternative risk models, 
that is found to be optimal in most of the examples presented.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the five indices 
for the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the different models of risk that are optimal for 
each index and for each time period. Section 4 presents some conclusions.  
 
2. Description of the Stock Indexes  
 
For purposes of illustrating the major point, we chose the following stock indices: Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA), Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE), Hang Seng Index 
(HS), Nikkei index, and Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) Composite index, from 3 January 
2000 to 15 July 2009. The indexes were selected for comparability with previous studies (see 
McAleer et al. (2009a, 2009b)) and also for containing a significant amount of variability. 
 
In Figure 1 we show the daily levels of the five indices. It is apparent that they have similar 
patterns of variability over time. However, a closer look at the correlation coefficients in 
Table 1 reveals that, while S&P500 has very high correlations with DJIA, FTSE and Nikkei, 
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the correlations between Nikkei and HSI of 0.634, and between FTSE and HSI of 0.698, are 
relatively low.    
 
When we turn our attention to the daily returns (see Figure 2 and Table 2), we observe the 
high (0.966) correlation between DJIA and S&P500, two indices in similar markets.  
However, the correlations between the other indices are lower which, in some cases, are as 
low as 0.112. This suggests that the returns behave somewhat differently in the four areas of 
the sample (namely, the USA,, United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Japan).  
 
Moreover, the changes in the index level for the whole period vary substantially across the 
indices, from a high of 2.7% for HS to -26.4% for DJIA, -36.4% for FTSE, -37.7% for 
S&P500, and -51.3% for Nikkei. 
 
Figure 3 and Table 3 show the volatilities of the returns, which are calculated as the standard 
deviations of the returns of each index. Turning to Table 3, we see that the correlation 
between the volatilities of DJIA and S&P500 is high (at 0.948), which is hardly surprising as 
they both refer to the US market. However, the correlations between the volatilities of the 
remainder of the indexes are somewhat smaller, with a maximum of 0.493 between DJIA and 
FTSE and a minimum of 0.195 between DJIA and Nikkei. 
 
From the above we can conclude that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity among the 
indices, so that we could learn from such diversity.  
 
3. Optimal Risk Models Before, During and After the 2008-09 Financial Crisis 
 
In this section it is illustrated that the best risk models for a given index may vary across time. 
We also illustrate the idea that the strategy that combines different risk models can be optimal 
for risk management under the Basel II Accord. In order to do so, we first define the best risk 
model as the model of VaR that gives the highest number of days in minimizing capital 
charges over a given period within the Basel II limits. In almost all cases, such a model also 
gives the minimum average daily capital charges (DCC) for the period considered (see 
McAleer et al. (2009b) for further details).  
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We take into account the restriction, under the Basel II limits, that the number of violations 
should be less than 10 within the previous 250 days (see Appendix 1), or proportionately if 
the period consists of fewer than 250 days. A violation is said to occur when the actual loss in 
a given day is larger than the forecast VaR for that day.   
 
In this paper we use seven alternative models of risk for predicting VaR. The specific models 
chosen are well known and widely used in the literature. In ascending order of complexity, 
except for the last case, these risk models are GARCH, GARCH-t, EGARCH, EGARCH-t, 
GJR, GJR-t, and Riskmetrics (1996) (see McAleer et al. (2009a) for a detailed description of 
each model). 
 
For the sake of exposition it is assumed that, for each stock index, an ADI follows passively 
the strategy of investing in the index. We then calculate the VaR and CR implied by each of 
the seven models of risk, and each of the five stock indexes for each of the three periods 
(namely, before, during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis). The empirical findings are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
When we consider only the basic strategies rather than combinations of models, in the second 
column is given the best model before the financial crisis. In the third column, we have the 
percentage of days for which it was the best model during the period considered. In the fourth 
column, we have the average DCC of each model before the financial crisis. This pattern is 
repeated in columns 5 to 10. During the 2008-09 financial crisis, GARCH, EGARCH and 
EGARCH-t are the best models. After the financial crisis, the best risk model was EGARCH 
across all the indexes. Thus, it is observed that the best model changed for all the indices 
during and after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The precise dates of the financial crisis for 
each index are given in Table 7 of Appendix 2. 
 
ADIs need not restrict themselves to using only one of the available risk models. McAleer et 
al. (2009b) proposed a risk management strategy that consists in choosing from among 
different combinations of alternative risk models to forecast VaR. We first consider a 
combination of models that might be characterized as an aggressive risk strategy, namely the 
supremum (SUP), and another that might be regarded as a conservative risk strategy, namely 
the infinum (INF).  
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The supremum VaR strategy, which is calculated for the individual models of volatility, 
reflects an aggressive risk management strategy since it chooses the supremum of the VaR for 
each individual model (namely, the smallest in absolute value as it is negative). The infinum 
strategy chooses the infinum of the VaR (namely, the largest in absolute value), which is 
calculated for individual models of volatility,reflects a conservative risk management 
strategy. Given the two combined strategies, we obtain the empirical results that are given in 
Table 5. 
 
It can be seen that the supremum (SUP) strategy is optimal in 11 of 15 cases. In only 4 of 15 
cases is the single model strategy found to be optimal. It can be observed that, in general, the 
average DCC values in Table 5 are lower than thir counterparts in Table 4. 
 
These empirical findings suggest strongly that using combinations of risk models can lead to 
substantially lower daily average capital requirements than using only single models, while 
staying within the limits of violations of the Basel II Accord. A complementary strategy to the 
one of using the aggressive supremum strategy or the conservative infinum strategy is to use 
the DYLES strategy proposed in McAleer et al. (2009a). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Under the Basel II Accord, ADIs have to communicate their risk estimates to the relevant 
monetary authorities, using a variety of VaR models to estimate and forecast risk. ADIs are 
subject to a back-testing procedure that compares the daily VaR with the subsequently 
realized returns. Under the Basel II Accord, ADIs that fail the back-test can be subject to the 
imposition of standard models that can lead to higher daily capital costs.  
 
In this paper we defined risk management in terms of choosing optimally from a variety of 
conditional volatility (or risk) models, and considered combining alternative risk models. 
These issues were illustrated using five major stock market indices, namely the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA), Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE) index, Nikkei (NK) 
index, Hang Seng (HSI) index, and Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) Composite index, 
from 3 January 2000 to 15 July 2009. 
 
The two main empirical findings of the paper are as follows: 
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1- Optimal risk management models change with the financial crisis.  
 
Alternative risk models were found to be optimal before, during and after the 2008-09 
financial crisis for the different indices considered. The feasible, sensible and optimal 
strategy of choosing different models of daily risk is an implication of the empirical 
results. 
   
2- Optimal risk management within Basel II requires to use combinations of models.  
 
In this paper we proposed a general strategy for constructing risk management models 
that used combinations of several models for forecasting VaR. An aggressive risk 
management strategy, namely choosing the supremum of the forecasted VaR of 
alternative risk models, was found to be optimal in most of the examples considered.  
 
An explanation as to why a particular model might be optimal in over a specified period for a 
given index is an open question that remains for further research.   
 
 9
References  
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (1996), Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
incorporate market risks, BIS, Basel, Switzerland. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2005), Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
incorporate market risks, BIS, Basel, Switzerland. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2009), Proposed enhancements to the Basel II 
framework, Consultative Document, BIS, Basel, Switzerland. 
Caporin, M. and M. McAleer (2009), The Ten Commandments for managing investments, to 
appear in Journal of Economic Surveys (Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342265). 
Jiménez-Martín, J.-A., McAleer, M. and T. Pérez-Amaral (2009), The Ten Commandments 
for managing value-at-risk under the Basel II Accord, to appear in Journal of Economic 
Surveys (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356803).  
Jorion, P. (2000), Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk, 
McGraw-Hill, New York.  
McAleer, M. (2005), Automated inference and learning in modeling financial volatility, 
Econometric Theory, 21, 232-261. 
McAleer, M. (2009), The Ten Commandments for optimizing value-at-risk and daily capital 
charges, to appear in Journal of Economic Surveys (Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354686).  
McAleer, M., J.-Á. Jiménez-Martin and T. Pérez-Amaral (2009a), A decision rule to 
minimize daily capital charges in forecasting value-at-risk, to appear in Journal of 
Forecasting (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349844). 
McAleer, M., J.-Á. Jiménez-Martin and T. Pérez-Amaral (2009b), Has the Basel II Accord 
Encouraged Risk Management During the 2008-09 Financial Crisis? , Department of 
Quantitative Economics, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain (Available at SSRN 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1397239). 
McAleer, M. and B. da Veiga (2008a), Forecasting value-at-risk with a parsimonious 
portfolio spillover GARCH (PS-GARCH) model, Journal of Forecasting, 27, 1-19. 
McAleer, M. and B. da Veiga (2008b), Single index and portfolio models for forecasting 
value-at-risk thresholds, Journal of Forecasting, 27, 217-235. 
RiskmetricsTM (1996), J.P. Morgan Technical Document, 4th Edition, New York, J.P. Morgan. 
 
 10
 
Figure 1 
Daily data for DJIA, FTSE, HS, NIKKEI and S&P500 
from 3 January 2000 to 14 July 2009 
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Table 1. Correlations between Indices 
 
 
Index DJIA FTSE HS NIKKEI S&P500
DJIA  1.00 
FTSE  0.834  1.000 
HSI  0.820  0.698  1.000 
NIKKEI  0.786  0.916  0.634  1.000 
S&P500  0.915  0.952  0.724  0.914  1.000 
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Figure 2 
Daily returns for DJIA, FTSE, HS, NIKKEI and S&P500 
from 3 January 2000 to 14 July 2009 
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Table 2. Correlations of Returns 
 
Index DJIA FTSE HS NIKKEI S&P500
DJIA  1.000 
FTSE  0.482  1.000 
HS  0.184  0.365  1.000 
NIKKEI  0.112  0.303  0.581  1.000 
S&P500  0.966  0.494  0.198  0.111  1.000 
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Figure 3  
Daily volatility of DJIA, FTSE, HS, NIKKEI and S&P500 
from 3 January 2000 to 14 July 2009 
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Table 3. Correlations of Volatilities 
 
 
Index DJIA FTSE HS NIKKEI S&P500
DJIA 1.000 
FTSE 0.493 1.000 
HS 0.296 0.372 1.000 
NIKKEI 0.195 0.307 0.476 1.000 
S&P500 0.948 0.492 0.297 0.197 1.000 
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Table 4  
 
Best Single Risk Models for Forecasting VaR for Each Index 
 
 
Index Before crisis During crisis After crisis 
 Best %  Avg Best %  Avg Best %  Avg 
DJIA GARCH 49.7 8.2 GARCH 81.4 17.5 EGARCH 86.9 12.4 
FTSE GARCH 42.2 8.5 EGARCH 84.2 17.3 EGARCH 83.3 12.5 
HSI EGARCH_t 0.00 11.0 GARCH 66.1 10.1 EGARCH 53.5 15.9 
NIKKEI GJR 44.6 10.4 EGARCH 45.4 17.9 EGARCH 87.9 12.41 
S&P500 GARCH 46.0 8.5 EGARCH_t 12.0 20.0 EGARCH 87.0 12.4 
 
Notes: %  denotes the percentage of days that the VaR model provides the minimum capital  
charges for the analyzed period.  
Avg denotes the average of the DCC for the sub-period. 
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Table 5  
 
Best Combination and Single Risk Models for Forecasting VaR for Each Index 
 
 
Index Before crisis During crisis After crisis 
 Best %  Avg Best %  Avg Best %  Avg 
DJIA SUP 99.0 7.71 GARCH 58.3 17.5 SUP 100 11.9 
FTSE SUP 87.8 8.02 SUP 100 16.9 SUP 95.8 12.0 
HS INF 0.0    12.5 SUP 100 9.5 SUP 51.3 15.6 
NIKKEI GJR 35.0 10.4 SUP 75 17.5 SUP 100 11.9 
S&P500 SUP 56.7 8.2 EGARCH_t 8.0 20.0 SUP 98.9 11.9 
 
Notes: %  denotes the percentage of days that the VaR model provides the minimum capital  
charges for the analyzed period.  
Avg denotes the average of the DCC for the sub-period. 
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Appendix 1. Forecasting Value-at-Risk and Daily Capital Charges   
  
The Basel II Accord stipulates that daily capital charges (DCC) must be set at the higher of 
the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 business days, multiplied by a 
factor (3+k) for a violation penalty, wherein a violation involves the actual negative returns 
exceeding the VaR forecast negative returns for a given day: 
  
 ( ){ }______60 1sup 3 VaR ,   VaRt tDCC k −= − + −  (1) 
 
where   
DCC = daily capital charges, which is the higher of ( ) 160______ VaR  and VaR3 −−+− tk ,  
tVAR  = Value-at-Risk for day t,  
tttt zYVAR σˆˆ ⋅−= ,  
60
______
VaR  = mean VaR over the previous 60 working days,  
tYˆ = estimated return at time t,  
tz = 1% critical value of the distribution of returns at time t,   
tσˆ = estimated risk (or square root of volatility) at time t,   10 ≤≤ k   is the Basel II violation penalty (see Table 6). 
 
 
The multiplication factor (or penalty), k, depends on the central supervisory authority’s 
assessment of the ADI’s risk management practices and the results of a simple back test. It is 
determined by the number of times actual losses exceed a particular day’s VaR forecast 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)). The minimum multiplication factor of 3 
is intended to compensate for various errors that can arise in model implementation, such as 
simplifying assumptions, analytical approximations, small sample biases and numerical errors 
that tend to reduce the true risk coverage of the model. Increases in the multiplication factor 
are designed to increase the confidence level that is implied by the observed number of 
violations to the 99 per cent confidence level, as required by the regulators (for a detailed 
discussion of VaR, as well as exogenous and endogenous violations (for further details, see 
McAleer (2009), Jiménez-Martin et al. (2009), and McAleer et al. (2009a)). 
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Table 6  
Basel II Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 business days. 
The penalty structure under the Basel II Accord is specified for 
the number of violations and not their magnitude, either 
individually or cumulatively.  
 
 
 
 
 17
 
Appendix 2 
Level and Dates of the Recession for Each Index 
 
Table 7. Dates from Peak to Trough 
 
Index peak_value peak_date trough_value trough_date 
DJIA 11782.35 11/8/2008 6547.050 9/3/2009 
FTSE 5636.610 29/8/2008 3512.090 3/3/2009 
HS 22862.60 1/8/2008 11015.84 27/10/2008 
NIKKEI 13430.91 11/8/2008 7054.980 10/3/2009 
S&P500 1305.323 11/8/2008 676.5302 9/3/2009 
 
                    Note: The peak and the trough of each index are considered at the  
                    beginning and the end of the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
 
